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Demonstrably doing accountability in the
Internet of Things
Lachlan Urquhart*, Tom Lodge† and Andy Crabtree‡
ABSTRACT
This article explores the importance of accountability to data protection (DP), and
how it can be built into the Internet of Things (IoT). The need to build accountability
into the IoT is motivated by the opaque nature of distributed data ﬂows, inadequate
consent mechanisms and lack of interfaces enabling end-user control over the behav-
iours of Internet-enabled devices. The lack of accountability precludes meaningful en-
gagement by end users with their personal data and poses a key challenge to creating
user trust in the IoT and the reciprocal development of the digital economy. The
European Union General Data Protection Regulation 2016 (EU GDPR) seeks to rem-
edy this particular problem by mandating that a rapidly developing technological eco-
system be made accountable. In doing so, it foregrounds new responsibilities for data
controllers, including DP by design and default, and new data subject rights such as
the right to data portability. While GDPR is ‘technologically neutral’, it is nevertheless
anticipated that realizing the vision will turn upon effective technological development.
Accordingly, this article examines the notion of accountability, how it has been trans-
lated into systems design recommendations for the IoT and how the IoT Databox
puts key DP principles into practice.
KEYWORDS : Internet of Things, privacy engineering, edge computing, personal in-
formation management systems, accountability, data protection
INTRODUCTION
The ‘connected home’ currently sits at the ‘peak of inflated expectations’ in Gartner’s
often-cited hype cycle, and the Internet of Things (IoT) is a key driver of the hype.1
A cursory glance at the consumer IoT market reveals swathes of household goods
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with the prefix ‘smart’ or ‘intelligent’ on offer, spanning white good to fixtures and
fittings embedded in the fabric of the home.2 The promise of the IoT is greater con-
venience, security, safety, efficiency and comfort in a user’s everyday life. While the
necessity of many IoT products and services may be questionable,3 anticipated
growth in the sector is vast: major IT firms like Cisco, Ericsson, General Electric and
Accenture all predict billions of networked devices in the coming years.4 The IoT es-
sentially trades on data, both actively and passively, with inputs ranging from explicit
spoken voice commands to sensed data inputs implicated in such things as move-
ment or temperature monitoring. The IoT also aligns with other trends in comput-
ing, particularly big data, cloud computing and machine learning, with personal data
collected by IoT devices typically being distributed to the cloud for processing and
analytics.
Accompanying the diversity of IoT devices and services are concerns centring on
privacy and trust. When sensing occurs in the home, for example, patterns of behav-
iour can be detected and inferences made about inhabitants’ lifestyles. Depending
who is making these inferences, and who they share the data with, privacy harms can
emerge. As Nissenbaum argues, inappropriate flows of information between contexts
can cause harm to an individual’s sense of privacy.5 The nascent nature of the indus-
try means there is a lack of harmonized standards for building IoT devices in ways
that sufficiently foreground and anticipate data protection (DP) concerns.6 Building
trustworthy relationships with consumers in the new IoT infrastructure is critical,
and not least because an increasing awareness that IoT devices leak data or can easily
be hacked and implicated in widespread distributed denial of service attacks contrib-
utes to a diminishing sense of trust in the emerging infrastructure.7
Against this background we elaborate key challenges posed by the IoT from a
regulatory perspective and how these practically occasion the need for accountability.
These include challenges posed by devices that lack or only provide partial user
interfaces and compliant consent mechanisms; the opacity of data flows to end users
and the spectrum of General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) control rights;
machine to machine (M2M) communications and the legitimacy of access; and
cloud storage and international data transfer safeguards. We move on to explore vari-
ous aspects of the Accountability Principle, first its history in DP governance and
2 ‘IoT List’ <http://iotlist.co> accessed 21 June 2018.
3 ‘The Internet of Useless Things’ <http://www.internetofuselessthings.io> accessed 21 June 2018.
4 Gartner, ‘Gartner Says 8.4 Billion Connected “Things” Will Be in Use in 2017, Up 31 Percent from 2016’
Gartner Newsroom (7 Feb 2017) <https://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3598917> accessed 21 June
2018.
5 Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in Context: Technology, Policy, and the Integrity of Social Life (Stanford
University Press 2009).
6 Ian Brown, Regulation and the Internet of Things (International Telecommunications Union 2015)
<https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Conferences/GSR/Documents/GSR2015/Discussion_papers_and_
Presentations/GSR_DiscussionPaper_IoT.pdf> accessed on 21 June 2018; Karen Rose, Internet of Things:
An Overview (Internet Society 2015) <https://www.sfbayisoc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/ISOC-
IOT-FEB-2016-Rose.pdf> accessed 21 June 2018.
7 World Economic Forum, Rethinking Personal Data: A New Lens for Strengthening Trust (World Economic
Forum 2014) <http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_RethinkingPersonalData_ANewLens_Report_
2014.pdf> accessed 21 June 2018.
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then how it is presented in Article 5(2) of GDPR.8 This exploration involves ques-
tioning the nature of the account to be provided, how it is to be provided and to
whom. We situate Article 5(2) within the wider context of GDPR, turning to various
requirements of Article 24 as interpreted in GDPR recitals, and other related articles,
to map how they intersect with accountability. The requirements of GDPR pose dis-
tinct challenges to the development of technological systems and we subsequently
turn to consider the recommendations of the Article 29 Working Party, and how
they envisage GDPR playing out in the IoT, as a preface to presenting the IoT
Databox. We conclude by mapping how the IoT Databox addresses the different ac-
countability requirements of GDPR.
THE PRACTICAL NEED TO BUILD ACCOUNTABILITY INTO THE
IOT
From May 2018, GDPR will be enforced across all European Union member states
(Regulation 2016/679). It will also affect data controllers outside Europe if they tar-
get goods and services to, or otherwise monitor, European Union (EU) citizens.9
Seeking to bring DP laws into the 21st century, GDPR replaces the pre-Internet
Data Protection Directive 1995.10 The IoT sector is heavily driven by personal data,
meaning it is critical that IoT developers negotiate their relationship with the new
user rights and controller responsibilities mandated by GDPR. This includes a raft of
fresh legal rules governing the processing of personal data, along with extension of
the rights provided to data subjects and the responsibilities incumbent on data con-
trollers, all of which are impacted by the underlying technological infrastructure.
Lack of or partial user interfaces and consent
The design of IoT devices is heterogeneous. Unlike mobile phones, where users can
develop mental models about how these devices work,11 ‘interfaces’ to the IoT vary
immensely. Many IoT devices do not have screens and communication with users
and rely instead on lights or sounds or haptic feedback; text notifications to mobile
phones may also be leveraged in the absence of direct device feedback occasioned by
the desire to create aesthetically pleasing devices, which may in turn result in opacity
about device functionality. This diversity makes it hard for users to understand what
personal information is being collected and how it is being used. From a regulatory
perspective, this shapes the nature of consent mechanisms. Consent is one legal basis
for processing personal data. Consent follows a notice and choice model, meaning it
should be informed, unambiguous, freely given and specific to a particular process,
and enable a clear indication of the data subject’s will.12 Data subjects need to affirm
8 European Union, ‘Regulation 2016/679 General Data Protection Regulation’ (2016) 59 OJ 4.
Hereinafter ‘GDPR’.
9 art 3(2) GDPR.
10 European Union, ‘Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October
1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free
Movement of Such Data’ (1995) 281 OJ L 31, 50 (hereinafter ‘DPD’).
11 Martina Ziefle and Susanne Bay, ‘Mental Models of a Cellular Phone Menu’ in Stephen Brewseter and
Mark Dunlop (eds), Mobile Human Computer Interaction (Springer 2014) 25–37.
12 art 2(h) DPD; art 4(11) GDPR.
Building accountability into the IoT  3
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/ijlit/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/ijlit/eay015/5259368 by The U
niversity of Edinburgh user on 17 January 2019
their choice, and if the type of data being processed is within special categories of
personal data (eg health, gender, race or biometric information) explicit consent is
needed. Such consent cannot be obtained through pre-ticked boxes, silence or in-
activity by the subject.13 The dominant web-based model takes advantage of the
affordances of mobile devices, using screens to display privacy policies, and terms
and condition contracts containing large blocks of text. Extensive research shows
users do not read this text, as it would take an incredibly long time to do so hence
they often agree in any case.14 Even if they did read it, they cannot renegotiate as it
is a form contract and may not understand it due to complex literacy requirements.15
This situation is not ideal and challenges the notion of legally compliant consent.
The heterogeneity of IoT devices could be good or bad for consent processes. On
the one hand, consent could be frustrated by devices which, by design, ambiently col-
lect data and have interfaces that lack affordances for communicating clear informa-
tion. This could be particularly challenging for homes, where children and adults
cohabit, as GDPR introduces stricter requirements about delivering clear, concise,
comprehensible information to children about data processing.16 However, on the
other hand, the IoT poses an opportunity to redesign how consent is done with
users. Taking advantage of new interaction methods may provide for the ‘ongoing’
negotiation of terms of consent.17
Opacity of data flows to end users and control
IoT devices and the digital ecosystems they feed into are largely opaque in how they
handle data. Insofar as end users may struggle to understand how their devices work,
given the lack of effective interfaces, this may in turn lead to lack of legibility in how
data is being processed, why, by whom, where it is being stored, for how long, etc.18
This has the knock-on effect of making it hard for users exercise their legal rights
and to control use of their information. While no hierarchical framing of rights is
encoded in GDPR, a spectrum of various control rights enabling data subjects to es-
calate action from controllers is nevertheless discernible and underpin accountability
in GDPR:
1. Article 15 the ‘right to access’, or the right to discover what data is held by
the controller about the data subject.
13 Recital 32 GDPR.
14 Aleecia McDonald and Lorrie Cranor, ‘The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies’ (2008) 4 I/S 543.
15 Ewa Luger, Stuart Moran and Tom Rodden, ‘Consent for All’, Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference
on Human Factors in Computing Systems, Paris, 2013, 2687–96.
16 art 12 GDPR.
17 Ewa Luger and Tom Rodden, ‘The Value of Consent: Discussions with Designers of Ubiquitous
Computing Systems’, Proceedings of the International Conference on Pervasive Computing and
Communication Workshops, New York, USA, 2014, 388–93; Lachlan Urquhart and Tom Rodden, ‘New
Directions in Information Technology Law: Learning from Human–Computer Interaction’ (2017) 31
IRLCT 150.
18 Peter Tolmie and others, ‘“This Has to Be the Cats”—Personal Data Legibility in Networked Sensing
Systems’, Proceedings of the 19th ACM Conference on Computer-Supported Cooperative Work &
Social Computing, San Francisco, CA, 2016, 490–501.
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2. Article 16 the ‘right to rectiﬁcation’, or the right to correct erroneous data
held by the controller.
3. Article 21 the ‘right to object’, or the right to object to the processing of
data by the controller.
4. Article 18 the ‘right to restriction of processing’, or the right to require the
controller to restrict processing of data.
5. Article 20 the ‘right to data portability’, or the right to have a controller pro-
vide data to the data subject in a commonly used, machine readable format
to take to another controller.
6. Article 17 the ‘right to erasure’, or the right to have data deleted by control-
ler and for the data subject to thereby be forgotten.
Each of these control rights occasions practical challenges of implementation. If
we take data portability, for example, how can data from sensors be moved between
IoT service providers in a usable way?19 Equally challenging and key to control is the
need to surface and make visible what information is being processed in the first
place.
M2M communications and access
The connected home consists of a network of connected devices, many of which
may interact with one another. We already see this commercially, with home man-
agement system like ‘Works with Nest’ or Apple’s ‘HomeKit’ linking together manu-
facture devices and third-party offerings. However, and again due to the paucity of
interfaces to the IoT, the lack of human oversight in M2M communications makes it
hard for users to know what is being shared between devices, and if this is context-
ually appropriate or not. A good example is sensitive personal data collected by a
smart mirror detecting someone’s skin condition or smart bathroom scales sensing
rapid weight loss over time indicating health conditions.20 Ideally, to respect the
agency of users and build their trust, this should not be shared with a health insur-
ance mandated wearable health tracker, unless the user wants it to. Similarly, access
by an Amazon Dash inspired replenishment button, perhaps sponsored by a pharma-
ceutical firm pushing a new skincare range, should have human oversight too. The
challenge here is balancing the movement of personal data, utility from devices, busi-
ness models and ensuring legitimate access to data by different devices and services.
By limiting the role of users in the loop, it becomes harder to know if appropriate ac-
cess is being given (or not) by devices. Linking data sets without adequate access
management could also have impacts for data controllers, who need to ensure com-
pliance with DP rules, and users, who may suffer information privacy harms through
unexpected data sharing.
19 Lachlan Urquhart, Neelima Sailaja and Derek McAuley, ‘Realising the Right to Data Portability for the
Domestic Internet of Things’ (2017) 22 Pers Ubiqui Comput 317.
20 Nokia Health—<https://health.nokia.com/eu/en/> accessed 21 June 2018.
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Cloud storage and international data transfer
The nature of remote, cloud-based data storage utilized by most IoT devices is also
problematic under GDPR. Services using IoT sensor data often store collected data
in servers located outside of the EU. This enables businesses to create large data sets,
used in training of machine learning algorithms and finding patterns that can be used
either in service delivery, or creation of new services. Managing big data sets raises
challenges addressing the velocity, variety, veracity and volume of data.21 From the
perspective of ensuring GDPR compliance, users will struggle to know where their
data is, or how they can access and control it when its storage location is likely un-
known or geographically distant. Again, oversight over what it is being used for
becomes difficult and from a legal perspective, issues of jurisdiction and applicable
law in contract clauses can come to the fore. From a DP stance, adequate protection
of data when it leaves the EU is difficult, and measures to guarantee protection, like
Privacy Shield (which replaced the former Safe Harbor agreement) or model con-
tract clauses all have their flaws.22 Furthermore, as mentioned above, Article 3(2)
expands the reach of GDPR for controllers outside of the EU monitoring or target-
ing goods and services towards EU citizens. Cloud providers may not be able to ig-
nore the importance of GDPR in compliance. The alternative of local data storage,
keeping information proximate to end users is preferable for ensuring their control
over how it is processed, and ensuring more user centric, ethical IoT applications
can emerge in the future. The IoT ecosystem, by design, is opaque, and its actions
often invisible to end users. In contravention of DP law principles, interactions are
being designed that provide little information about how devices function, what data
is collected and what trade-offs consumers are making in order to receive relevant
services. This is not sustainable, and risks growth of the sector. It is for these reasons
that we argue that accountability needs to be built into the IoT. But what exactly do
we mean?
ACCOUNTABILITY?
We are of the view that the answer to many of the regulatory issues surfaced by IoT
is to build accountability into products and services, by design. Increased dialogue
between data controllers and data subjects is needed so that citizens can exercise bet-
ter control over how their personal data is exploited in the digital economy. Due to
GDPR, interest in accountability as a governance mechanism is growing. However, it
remains a difficult concept to succinctly pin down. The accountability principle is
only substantively mentioned ‘once’ in GDPR, in Article 5(2), excluding reference in
recitals 61 and 85 in the context of data breaches. However, its implications quickly
spiral when read in the wider context of GDPR, in conjunction with Article 24, vari-
ous recitals, and other relevant articles.
21 ICO, Big Data, Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning and Data Protection (Information Commissioner’s
Office 2017) <https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/2013559/big-data-ai-ml-and-
data-protection.pdf> accessed 21 June 2018.
22 See European Data Protection Supervisor, Opinion 4/2016 on the EU-US Privacy Shield Draft Adequacy
Decision (EDPS 2016) and art 29 Working Party, WP238 Opinion 01/2016 on the EU-US Privacy Shield
Draft Adequacy Decision (art 29 Working Party 2016).
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Historically, there has been a strong relationship between accountability and DP
compliance. In this context, accountability has traditionally been invoked as a mech-
anism for implementing DP principles.23 As Aldahoff and others point out:
. . . even in instruments where accountability is not called out as a separate
data protection principle, many of its substantive provisions were in fact
designed to enable accountability.24
The Article 29 Working Party has argued that accountability obliges data controllers
to put in place effective policies and mechanisms to ensure compliance with DP
rules.25 This view is endorsed by Aldahoff and others who underscore the import-
ance of making data processing entities answerable—of ‘calling them to account’—
for the implementation of appropriate safeguards.26 The European Data Protection
Supervisor (EDPS) emphasizes that accountability is not a prescriptive bureaucratic
measure merely concerned with validation, but is about proactive leadership to foster
a broad culture of accountability.27 The introduction of GDPR puts measures in
place that further develop this culture of accountability.
Adopting a similar framing of the accountability principle created 37 years ago in
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Guidelines
on the Protection of Privacy and Trans-Border Flows of Personal Data 1980 (para-
graph 14), GDPR states:
The controller shall be responsible and be able to demonstrate compliance
with, paragraph 1 (‘accountability’). (Article 5(2))
This means the controller is responsible for processing personal data in compliance
with principles found in GDPR, which are themselves similar to OECD good DP
governance principles (paragraphs 7–13). Article 5(1) GDPR includes: (i) lawful-
ness, fairness and transparency; (ii) purpose limitation; (iii) data minimization;
(iv) accuracy; (v) storage limitation; (vi) integrity and confidentiality. Where OECD
and GDPR differ is in the explicit requirement for ‘demonstration’ of compliance
with the different principles. Accordingly, there is a two-part responsibility on data
controllers: firstly, to put the necessary measures in place to comply with Article
5(1), and secondly, to find ways to demonstrate they have complied. This could be
viewed as firstly a ‘substantive compliance with principles’ requirement, and secondly
as a ‘procedural demonstration of compliance to relevant stakeholders’ requirement.
We shall revisit these distinctive aspects of accountability in due course. First we
23 Charles Raab, ‘The Meaning of “Accountability” in the Information Privacy Context’ in Daniel Guagnin
and others (eds), Managing Privacy through Accountability (Palgrave Macmillan 2012) 15–32.
24 Joseph Alhadeff, Brendan Van Alsenoy and Jos Dumortier, ‘The Accountability Principle in Data
Protection Regulation: Origin, Development and Future Directions’ in Guagnin and others, ibid, 49–82.
25 art 29 Working Party, WP173 Opinion 3/2010 on the Principle of Accountability.
26 Alhadeff, Van Alsenoy and Dumortier (n 24).
27 EDPS website <https://edps.europa.eu/data-protection/our-role-advisor_en> accessed 21 June 2018.
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wish to consider what nature an account needs to take and to whom accountability
should be demonstrated.28
The nature of an account and to whom accountability must be demonstrated
The current approach in GDPR of not explicitly defining what accountability
requires of data controllers is intentional. This again follows OECD 1980 guidelines,
which as Alhadeff and others state:
. . . do not prescribe to whom the controller should be accountable (the
‘accountee’), nor what this relationship should look like.29
In their 2010 Opinion on the Principle of Accountability, the Article 29 Working
Party (A29 WP) suggested that putting an explicit accountability principle into
GDPR would enable case-by-case analysis of appropriate measures, and be preferable
to predefining requirements due to this approach being more flexible and scalable.
Seven years on, if we look to the most recent A29 WP guidance on Data Protection
Impact Assessments,30 it retains a non-prescriptive stance about measures needed for
accountability, beyond publishing Data Protection Impact Assessments (DPIAs) and
the obligation for record keeping. Lack of detailed prescriptive guidance around such
a central concept is consistent with original OECD practice, and keeps accountability
sufficiently flexible as a notion. Despite the virtues of flexibility, a sticking point for
accountability in practice is the form a ‘demonstrable’ account needs to take.
In seeking to answer this, Raab argues that giving an account is akin to ‘telling a
story’ and can be seen to operate at three sequential levels.31 At its most simple, ac-
countability merely obliges an organization to report back on its actions. The next
level requires mechanisms for that story to be questioned, and for data subjects to
offer their own. The third level puts sanctions in place for when an account is poor,
either due to inaction or lack of a proper story being offered in the first place. Whilst
this provides some abstract navigational aid, it does not pin down the precise dimen-
sions of a good ‘account’. A series of European projects including Galway, Paris and
Madrid have been grappling with the nature of accountability.32 The Paris project
document elaborates elements organizations need to put in place to demonstrate
28 Colin Bennett, ‘International Privacy Standards: Can Accountability Ever Be Adequate?’(2010) 106
Privacy L & Bus Intl 21.
29 Joseph Alhadeff, Brendan Van Alsenoy and Jos Dumortier (n 24).
30 art 29 Working Party, WP248 Guidelines on Data Protection Impact Assessment (DPIA) and Determining
Whether Processing Is “Likely to Result in a High Risk” for the Purposes of Regulation 2016/679 (art 29
Working Party 2017).
31 Raab (n 23).
32 Martin Abrams, Data Protection Accountability: The Essential Element (Centre for Information Policy
Leadership 2009) <https://www.hunton.com/files/webupload/CIPL_Galway_Accountability_Paper.
pdf> accessed on 21 June 2018; Martin Abrams, Demonstrating and Measuring Accountability (Centre for
Information Policy Leadership 2010) <http://informationaccountability.org/wp-content/uploads/
CIPL_Accountability_Phase_II_Paris_Project-2.pdf> accessed on 21 June 2018; Martin Abrams,
Implementing Accountability in the Marketplace (Centre for Information Policy Leadership 2011) <http://
informationaccountability.org/wp-content/uploads/Centre_Accountability_Phase_III_White_Paper.
pdf> accessed on 21 June 2018.
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accountability.33 These largely consist of organizational measures, such as establish-
ing policies based on relevant law, setting up internal bodies to enforce these, provid-
ing staff training on information privacy, analysing risks on a regular basis, setting up
mechanisms to respond to customer complaints and providing appropriate redress
mechanisms. This sits against the wider work of the Galway project,34 which states
accountability in general requires organizational buy-in, particularly putting in place
internal standards that correlate with external requirements; access to resources to
support compliance with policies (training, etc); and internal oversight mechanisms
to ensure adherence, coupled with approaches for appropriate sanctions and rule
enforcement.
Examining guidance offered by the EDPS,35 and UK Information Commissioner
Office,36 we also find a range of new measures in GDPR to assist with accountability
requirements. We cluster these in terms of ‘technical’ or ‘organizational’ measures:
Technical measures
Data protection by design and default; including use of anonymization, pseudonym-
ization and end-to-end encryption; IT security risk management.
Organizational measures
Assigning DP officers (DPOs); prior consultations; certification schemes; DPIAs;
transparent policies; documentation and record keeping on processing for organiza-
tions with over 250 staff;37 internal compliance and audits for effectiveness of
approaches; training.
GDPR thus puts in place a raft of new organizational and technical ‘responsibil-
ities’ for controllers. Executing these responsibilities is not, as the EDPS puts it, sim-
ply a ‘box ticking exercise’.38 The challenge lies in implementing these organizational
and technical measures as a basis for demonstrating compliance. Thus, it is only
through the work of ‘doing’ compliance that accountability comes to life. As Ihde
reminds us ‘Left on a shelf, the Swiss army knife or the cell phone “does” nothing’.39
The same can be said for the measures mandated by GDPR. It is only when they are
built into the everyday practice that complex negotiations between controller and
33 Abrams, Demonstrating and Measuring Accountability, ibid.
34 ibid.
35 Giovanni Buttarelli, The Accountability Principle in the New GDPR, Speech at the European Court of
Justice, Luxembourg, 30 September 2016 <https://edps.europa.eu/data-protection/our-work/publica
tions/speeches/accountability-principle-new-gdpr-0_fr> accessed on 21 June 2018.
36 ICO, Guide to the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (Information Commissioner’s Office 2018)
<https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-the-general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr> accessed
21 June 2018.
37 The nature of what should be recorded is laid out in art 30 GDPR. See art 30(5) on conditions when
organisations smaller than 250 persons also need to keep records, for example, if they are handling special
categories of personal data, information relating to criminal convictions, etc. See also recitals 13, 39 and
82 for more detail on reporting.
38 Buttarelli (n 35).
39 Don Ihde, ‘Smart? Amsterdam Urinals and Autonomic Computing’ in Mirielle Hildebrandt and
Antoinette Rouvroy (eds), Law Human Agency and Autonomic Computing: Philosophy of Law Meets the
Philosophy of Computing (Routledge 2011) ch 1.
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user will emerge, and we can understand what an ‘account’ may demonstrably look
like.
It is equally difficult to succinctly pin down to whom accountability should be
demonstrated. The Madrid Resolution attempts to set up international standards on
accountability and states that demonstrations should be to supervisory authorities
and data subjects.40 However, GDPR is not framed as narrowly. Whilst data subjects
and supervisory authorities are clear stakeholders, Article 5(2) is not limited to them,
and it is artificial to read Article 5 in isolation of the rest of GDPR, which places
many other responsibilities on data controllers. Article 24 specifically focuses on the
nature of their wider responsibilities:
Taking into account the nature, scope, context and purposes of processing as
well as the risks of varying likelihood and severity for the rights and freedoms
of natural persons, the controller shall implement appropriate technical and or-
ganisational measures to ensure and to be able to demonstrate that processing
is performed in accordance with this Regulation. (Article 24(1))
Article 24 surfaces concepts that need to be read in conjunction with Article 5(2), to
situate the full extent of data controller responsibilities in GDPR. We focus on the
four key issues emphasized above.
Nature, scope, context and purposes of processing, and risks of varying likelihood and se-
verity. As these two elements are linked, we consider them side by side. In determin-
ing the ‘nature, scope, context and purposes of processing’, recital 76 GDPR states
‘objective risk assessment’ is necessary to establish the level of risk attendant to data
processing, for example, if it is risk or high risk. Recital 75 provides examples of par-
ticular kinds of risk occasioned by data processing, including when it results in dis-
crimination, financial loss, identity theft or fraud, damage to reputation and reversal
of pseudonyms, to name a few. Whilst Article 24 requires assessment of risk, in gen-
eral, it does not call for a DPIA in all cases. However, the focus on risk analysis clear-
ly links to Article 35 which requires a DPIA for processing ‘likely to result in high
risks’. The nature of ‘high risk’ is explored in depth A29 WP DPIA guidance,41 which
provides nine examples of high risk processing including processing of data concern-
ing vulnerable data subjects, combining datasets, innovative use of data for new
technological/organizational solutions or preventing data subjects accessing a service.
Determining the need for DPIAs, and differentiating the distinctions between risk as-
sessment in Articles 24 and 35 is a complex exercise. The nine A29 WP examples are
quite broad and many IoT applications will likely require a DPIA. This is not neces-
sarily a bad thing, as DPIAs are an important accountability mechanism providing
for ‘building and demonstrating compliance’. Nonetheless, it is uncertain why Article
24 does not just state DPIAs are always necessary, as this seems to be the practical
implication of A29 WP guidance.
40 Abrams, Implementing Accountability in the Marketplace (n 32).
41 art 29 Working Party (n 30).
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Implementation of appropriate technical and organizational measures. The language of
‘technical and organizational’ measures to demonstrate compliance in Article 24
closely aligns with Article 25 requirements on ‘DP by design and default’ (DPbD).
DPbD obliges data controllers to safeguard the freedoms and rights of individuals at
the time of the determination of the means for processing ‘and’ at the time of the
processing itself. This may require minimizing the processing of personal data, pseu-
donymizing personal data as soon as possible, enabling transparency with regard to
the functions and processing of personal data, and allowing the data subject to moni-
tor data processing.42 In addition, by default, technical and organizational measures
should be taken to ensure that:
1. Only personal data which are necessary for each speciﬁc purpose of process-
ing are processed.
2. The amount of personal data collected, the extent of their processing, the
period of their storage and their accessibility is controlled.
3. Personal data are not made accessible without the individual’s intervention
to an indeﬁnite number of natural persons.
In accordance with Article 24, taking into account the nature, scope, context, pur-
poses and risks of processing, DPbD shall reflect the ‘state of the art’.43 This includes
putting appropriate ‘technological’ measures in place to demonstrate accountability
and achieve compliance. Recital 63 of GDPR, for example, states that in regard to
data subject rights of access:
. . . where possible, the controller should be able to provide remote access to a
scure system which would provide the data subject with direct access to his or
her personal data.
We need to acknowledge, then, that GDPR invokes a turn to the systems design
community to engage with DP challenges, though we acknowledge the nature of
design’s new, explicit role in DP regulation remains unsettled.
Processing is performed in accordance with this regulation. This requirement brings us
full circle back to Article 5(2), that the controller shall demonstrate compliance with
accountability, which in turn pulls on other GDPR provisions. The ‘lawful, fair and
transparent’ principle in Article 5(1), for example, requires a turn to Chapter II
GDPR articles on lawful processing (Article 6) and consent (Article 7), to name but
two. When Article 5(2) is read in context of GDPR as a whole, we also need to
examine the nature of data controller responsibility documented in Article 24. Upon
doing this, the ‘breadth’ of responsibilities implicated by the accountability principle
become apparent. We believe it requires measures for compliance and subsequent
demonstration with the entire GDPR. It is hard to isolate provisions of GPDR, as
they often connect to and explicitly call on other provisions. This is clear with
42 Recital 78 GDPR.
43 art 25(1) GDPR.
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accountability, which starts as a narrow principle and grows in scope hugely as we
dig deeper. Nevertheless, some elements of GDPR align more naturally with the
principle. Two examples are transparency (Article 12) and record keeping (Article
30). Thus, accountability turns on the ability to question accounts provided by data
controllers around their data handling practices. This requires that record keeping
about data processing is in place to demonstrate that compliance with GDPR has
been considered and acted upon. Similarly, transparency is intrinsically linked to ac-
countability. Transparency mainly focuses on communication by requiring that proc-
essing information be provided in clear, concise language which data subjects (and
the public at large) can easily comprehend. As framed in GDPR, transparency is less
about providing mechanisms to hold controllers to account. Instead it intersects with
accountability by dictating the ‘nature of account giving’.
ACCOUNTABILITY REQUIREMENTS
Translation of the complex provisions of GDPR into more accessible principles is
needed if IoT developers are to build accountability into the IoT. We thus propose
seven actionable accountability requirements, which seek to address key challenges
occasioned by the IoT (as outlined above). These requirements highlight manifold
‘clusters’ of GDPR obligations. This clustering is not exhaustive, but given the broad
nature of accountability, we think it provides a useful starting point for considering
the nature of an account and substantive elements of GDPR data controllers need to
comply with to demonstrate accountability, as outlined below and summarized in
Table 1.
Requirement 1: limiting initial data collection
GDPR retains the classic DP principles in Article 5(1) of ‘purpose limitation’, ‘data
minimization’ and ‘storage limitation’. According to GDPR, personal data should
only be collected for ‘specified, explicit and legitimate purposes’ and not processed in
a manner incompatible with those initial purposes.44 Only what is ‘adequate, relevant
and necessary’ for those initial purposes should be processed.45 Furthermore, the
data should not be kept in a manner which identifies subjects (ie not anonymized)
longer than necessary for these purposes.46 Strict oversight over what is being col-
lected, why and how it is managed is necessary.
Requirement 2: limitations on international data transfer
GDPR provides strict requirements on when personal data can be sent outside
Europe. Article 44 states data should only be transferred to third countries on basis
of various conditions. Article 45 states transfers can occur to countries deemed to
provide adequate protection by the European Commission, including Uruguay,
44 art 5(1)(b) GDPR.
45 art 5(1)(c) GDPR.
46 art 5(1)(e) GDPR, with the exception of longer storage for archiving in the public interest, scientific or
historical research or statistical purposes.
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Israel or New Zealand.47 Other grounds mandate that appropriate safeguards be put
in place (Article 46), such as use of standard DP contract clauses or binding corpor-
ate rules that govern data handling in an organization (Article 47). The Privacy
Shield 2016 agreement now covers data transfers to USA.48 It requires companies
apply the principles of notice and choice, and accountability for onward travel.
Minimal oversight is provided by the US Department of Commerce.49
Table 1: Accountability Requirements in GDPR
Accountability Requirement Source in GDPR
1. Limiting initial data
collection
Purpose limitation Article 5(1b); data minimization
Article 5(1c); storage limitation Article 5(1e)
2. Restrictions on inter-
national data transfer
Data sent outside Europe on basis of adequacy decision
Articles 44 and 45; binding corporate rules Article 47;
appropriate safeguards Article 46
3. Responding to the
spectrum of control
rights
Right to access Article 15; to rectiﬁcation Article 16; to
object Article 21; to restrict Article 18; to portability
Article 20; to erasure Article 17; information supply
chain (passing down requests for rectiﬁcation, erasure,
restriction) Article 19
4. Guaranteeing greater
transparency rights
Transparency of information Article 12; rights to provi-
sion of information Articles 13 and 14; algorithmic
proﬁling Article 22; record keeping Article 30
5. Ensuring lawfulness of
processing
Legality based on speciﬁc grounds (Article 5(1a) and
Article 6, eg performance of contract legitimate inter-
est); consent requirements Article 4 (11), Article 7,
Article 8 and Article 9
6. Protecting data storage
and security
Accuracy of data Article 5(1d); integrity and conﬁdenti-
ality Article 5(1f); breach notiﬁcation to authorities
Article 33 and to data subject Article 34; security of
processing Article 32
7. Articulating and
responding to process-
ing responsibilities
Articulating responsibilities: Data Protection Impact
Assessments Article 35; certiﬁcations including seals,
marks and certiﬁcation bodies Articles 42 and 43; new
codes of conduct Articles 40 and 41
Responding to responsibilities: DPO Articles 37 and 39;
DPbD Article 25
47 List of Third Countries with Adequacy Decisions <https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protec
tion/data-transfers-outside-eu/adequacy-protection-personal-data-non-eu-countries_en> accessed 21
June 2018.
48 It replaces the Safe Harbor Agreement, which was deemed inadequate due to the Schrems decision and
Snowden revelations about mass surveillance programmes.
49 Fact Sheet on Privacy Shield <https://www.commerce.gov/news/fact-sheets/2016/02/fact-sheet-over
view-eu-us-privacy-shield-framework> accessed 21 June 2018.
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Requirement 3: responding to the spectrum of control rights
GDPR provides a spectrum of new control rights around data processing, as
described above in Articles 15–21. We frame these as rights users can ‘escalate’ as
needed from access (Article 15) to rectification (Article 16), objection (Article 21),
restriction (Article 18), portability (Article 20) and ultimately erasure and the ‘right
to be forgotten’ (Article 17).
Requirement 4: guaranteeing greater transparency rights
GDPR provides for increased transparency in the relationship between data control-
ler and data subject. Information about processing, particularly concerning data sub-
ject rights, is to be provided in:
. . . concise, transparent, intelligible and easily accessible form, using clear and
plain language, in particular for any information addressed specifically to a
child . . . the information shall be provided in writing, or by other means,
including, where appropriate, by electronic means. (Article 12)
Controllers need to furnish the data subject with their identity, the purpose of and
legal basis for processing, recipients of their data and so forth (Article 13). They also
need to maintain records of processing under their control, including the actors
involved, the nature of processing, type of data collected, security measures taken
and so on (Article 30). The infamous Article 22 also tackles accountability in algo-
rithms and profiling. It provides a right for data subjects not to be subject to deci-
sions based solely on automated processing where the result has significant legal
effects (eg refusal of credit) or similar (eg prejudice from algorithmic profiling).50
Measures to protect data subjects should be implemented, at minimum, by providing
human oversight over such decisions and enabling subjects to voice concerns and
contest outcomes.51 This assumes that the actions and concomitant reasoning of
algorithms can be made accountable, a challenge in itself, particularly for machine
learning algorithms deployed in conjunction with IoT devices.
Requirement 5: ensuring lawfulness of processing
Consent is the most discussed grounds for lawful processing of personal data. As dis-
cussed in detail above, GDPR provides various requirements for consent mecha-
nisms (see Articles 4, 7, 8 and 9), which are problematic for the IoT. However,
consent is not the only basis for lawful processing. Article 6 includes other grounds,
namely the legitimate interests of the data controller, the necessity of processing for
performance of a contract the subject is party to, or for controller to satisfy a legal
obligation they are subject to. Nonetheless, and insofar as the IoT finds its way at
50 Unless provisions in art 22(2) apply, for example, automated processing is by virtue of a contract, author-
ized by law or by explicit consent of subject.
51 Literature is emerging on the existence of a ‘right to explanation’ and its utility see Lilian Edwards and
Michael Veale, ‘Slave to the Algorithm? Why a ‘Right to an Explanation’ is Probably not the Remedy You
Are Looking for’ (2017) 16 Duke L Tech Rev 1.
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scale into consumer goods, consent will remain an important ingredient in ensuring
the lawfulness of processing.
Requirement 6: protecting data storage and security
Numerous security and storage requirements exist in GDPR. Accuracy of data is key
and appropriate security should be provided, particularly against unauthorized or un-
lawful processing and against accidental loss, destruction or damage, using appropri-
ate technical or organizational measures (Article 5). This is accompanied by Article
32 requirements to put in place appropriate technical and organizational measures
for general security of processing drawing on pseudonymization and encryption,
regular security testing, ensuring resilience of services and timely restoration of data
after an incident.52 GDPR also has strict breach notification provisions around infor-
mation required and the time frame for reporting, within 72 hours to authorities
(Article 33). For data subjects, what is reported and when is more contingent on se-
verity of breach (Article 34).
Requirement 7: articulating and responding to processing responsibilities
GDPR encourages the adoption of mechanisms for data controllers to articulate their
responsibilities. Data protection impact assessments have a key role to play in map-
ping risks, forecasting their likelihood of occurrence, considering appropriate safe-
guards, implementing these and making this process of reflection public (Article 35).
In highlighting compliance with GDPR, an increased role is envisaged for certifica-
tion processes, using seals and marks (Articles 42 and 43). Similarly, it is envisaged
that new industry codes of conduct will emerge (Articles 40 and 41). In responding
to established responsibilities, GDPR guides action by controllers. For organizations
of a certain size, an appointed DPO will play a key internal oversight and guidance
role (Articles 37 and 39). More generally, the turn to technical measures, encapsu-
lated in Article 25 DPbD is ‘critical’ for the IoT.
BUILDING ACCOUNTABILITY INTO THE IOT
Article 25 introduces DPbD into law. It presupposes not only that technical but
‘also’ technological measures will be put in place to enable demonstrations of compli-
ance with the principle of accountability. However, as GDPR is ‘technologically neu-
tral’, it offers no insight to ‘systems designers’ as to how to build accountability into
the technological ecosystem generally or into the IoT specifically. Here we consider
how the IoT Databox model53 enables a technological response to the two-part com-
pliance and demonstration requirements of the GDPR Accountability Principle and
meets the accountability requirements detailed in Table 1.
52 art 33 GDPR stipulates, ‘Taking into account the state of the art, the costs of implementation and the na-
ture, scope, context and purposes of processing as well as the risk of varying likelihood and severity for
the rights and freedoms of natural persons’, which echoes the DPbD provision in art 25.
53 Alex Hern, ‘“Roomba Maker May Share Maps of Users” Homes with Google, Amazon or Apple’ The
Guardian (London 25 July 2017) <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jul/25/roomba-
maker-could-share-maps-users-homes-google-amazon-apple-irobot-robot-vacuum> accessed on 21 June
2018.
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Requirement 1: limiting initial data collection
Limiting data collection in the IoT is challenging insofar devices are intentionally
designed to collect extensive information in order to provide contextually aware serv-
ices (such as fine-grained heating management or home security). Limiting initial
data collection also sits uneasily with commercial (cloud-based) models underpin-
ning IoT technologies, which seek to repurpose data. Nonetheless, only collecting
what is functionally necessary for an IoT device, application or service to operate,
that is, for specific purposes, is clearly mandated by GDPR. The IoT Databox model
limits data collection through a number of architectural design choices, which are
reflected in Figure 1. The IoT Databox model sits on a networked minicomputer
that can be situated at the edge of the network (rather than in the cloud) in the
user’s home and implements the local control recommendation advocated by A29
WP to ‘enforce’ transparency and control.54 It exploits a Security by Design approach
at the outset, locally storing data in manifold containers or ‘data stores’ (rather than
one container or store) to minimize the potential attack surface and security prob-
lems associated with general purpose operating systems.55 The model posits a ‘user’
(by or about whom data is created), ‘data sources’ (eg connected devices or online
accounts, which generate or contain data about the user), ‘data stores’ (which collate
the data produced by data sources and can be accessed via an Application
Programming Interface or API), a ‘dashboard’ (which allows the user to manage
third party access to their data) and ‘data processors’ (external machines exploited
by data controllers who wish to make use of the user’s data in some way). Data proc-
essing is done by ‘apps’ which (like data stores) run within isolated containers on-
the-box and interact with data stores to perform a specified (purposeful) task. Apps
are obtained by users from an ‘app store’ and app development is supported by a
bespoke software development kit or ‘SDK’. Apps may query data stores, write to a
connected device’s store to perform actuation, and/or write to a communications
data store if they send the results of data processing to processing entities operating
on the controller’s behalf. Note, only ‘the results’ of data processing are distributed
by the IoT Databox; the raw data stays on-the-box. The IoT Databox model thus
represents a distinctive approach to personal data processing, limiting the amount of
data leaving connected devices and aggregating data at the nearest point of data col-
lection (ie, at the edge of the network) to enable ‘data minimization’.
The IoT Databox also limits data collection by enabling users to exercise choice,
and in the fine-grained ways advocated by A29 WP:
Device manufacturers must provide granular choices when granting access to
applications. The granularity should not only concern the category of collected
data, but also the time and frequency at which data are captured. (WP223)56
54 art 29 Working Party, WP223 Opinion 8/2014 on Recent Developments on the Internet of Things (art 29
Working Party 2014).
55 Anil Mudhavapeddy and David Scott, ‘Unikernels: The Rise of the Virtual Library Operating System’
(2014) 57 Commun ACM 61.
56 art 29 WP (n 54).
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Granular choice is enabled by ‘the manifest’ (Figure 2). Apps cannot be installed on the
box without a manifest being completed by the data subject (and an app cannot there-
fore be uploaded to the app store without a manifest). Manifests are, at their most, basic
‘multilayered notices’. They provide (i) a ‘short’ description of the specific purpose of
data processing, (ii) a ‘condensed’ description furnishing the information required under
Article 13 GDPR, and (iii) ‘full’ legal terms and conditions. The manifest provides this
information on-the-box, rather than on privacy notices placed on remote websites. In
addition, the IoT Databox adds ‘app information’ to the short description. This
includes: an app’s risk profile and its verified status (more on this shortly) and user rat-
ings. The manifest is an interactive component that also enables ‘control’ over data col-
lection at device level. The IoT Databox thus transforms multilayered notices into
dynamic, user configurable ‘consent mechanisms’ that not only inform potential app
users as to the specifics of data collection and processing, but also enable active control
(granular choice) over the categories of data collected and the time and frequency at
which they are collected. Thus, the IoT Databox enables compliance by implementing
an alternative architecture for the IoT, with the demonstration of compliance being pro-
vided through data minimization (the architecture constrains data distribution to the
results of queries) and granular choice mechanisms embedded in the manifest.
Requirement 2: limitations on international data transfer
Just where in the world data is distributed to requires particular attention under
GDPR, especially if they are transferred outside Europe or an adequate third country.
Figure 1: The IoT Databox model.
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Figure 2: Enabling granular choice.
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The architecture of the IoT Databox negates many—but by no means all—questions
to do with international data transfer, in locating data on-the-box, that is, on a physic-
al device situated in the data subject’s home. While the question of where the data is
stored potentially arises if the data subject runs a virtual backup of the data held on
the physical box but in such circumstances, and unlike current cloud-based PDMSs,
the decision of where to put the data is ultimately up to the user; the IoT Databox
enables data subjects to control where their data is stored. However, the question of
where the data is stored also arises with respect to the ‘results’ of third-party process-
ing run on-the-box: the outcomes of analytics ‘can’ travel. The manifest again plays
an important role here in providing an account to the user not only of what will be
done with their data but by whom, including (in the condensed layer) other recipi-
ents of the data and, where applicable, relevant adequacy decisions or safeguards.
The manifest also makes it accountable (in the short layer) whether or not data will
be taken off the box, and whether or not online access is provided to the data subject
if so.
That some degree of risk is occasioned by apps that take data off the box is also
clearly flagged to the data subject by an app’s risk rating. While the IoT Databox can-
not prevent data being taken off the box, it can incentivize a reduction in data trans-
fer through the risk rating mechanism, with apps that take data off the box and pass
it on to other recipients, particularly those located outside the EU, and/or which do
not provide online access being ‘severely’ rated. An app’s risk rating is not only dis-
played in the manifest but on the app store (Figure 3) to motivate and drive the de-
velopment of low-risk and even no-risk apps that do not export data, that provide
users with granular choice over data sampling and reporting frequency, and that pro-
vide online access if apps take data of the box. Low-risk apps approved by the plat-
form display a ‘verified’ status, and apps that do not take data off the box are also
badged with a check mark or tick. Further demonstrations of compliance may be
achieved in the future through the use of machine-readable add-ons to data transfers
such as blockchain, smart contracts or sticky policies (see, for example, Pearson and
Casassa-Mont on sticky policies57 or Christidis and Devetsikiotis on smart
contracts).58
Requirement 3: responding to the spectrum of control rights
In enforcing local control, the IoT Databox negates the spectrum of control rights to
some extent, for insofar as data stays on-the-box there is no need for access, rectifica-
tion, objection, restriction, portability or erasure. External support for the spectrum
of rights will still be required in cases where the results of local processing leave the
box, though the raw data is retained on-the-box and the specific processing opera-
tions performed on the raw data are logged for audit. External support for the spec-
trum of rights will also be required where IoT devices first export data to the cloud,
but that is beyond the IoT Databox’s remit. However, insofar as APIs make data
57 Siani Pearson and Marco Casassa-Mont, ‘Sticky Policies: An Approach for Managing Privacy across
Multiple Parties’ (2011) 44 Computer 60.
58 Konstantinos Christidis and Michael Devetsikiotis, ‘Blockchains and Smart Contracts for the Internet of
Things’ (2016) 4 IEEE Access 2292.
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available to the data subject or data is provided in a common machine-readable for-
mat, as per the right to data portability, then data subjects may store such data on
the box and reuse it for other purposes.
There is a particular aspect of the right to portability that is problematic, namely
it does not cover statistical inferences which are common to IoT data processing.
The spectrum of control rights does not necessarily prevent potential ‘harms’ that
stem from lack of control over inferences, as opposed to raw data, then.59 The IoT
Databox seeks to address this situation as by incentivizing local processing. This not
includes making potential risk accountable to data subjects but also to ‘app develop-
ers’. The IoT Databox model includes a bespoke software development kit or SDK,
Figure 3: At-a-glance risk (shield) and user (star) ratings.
59 Urquhart, Sailaja and McAuley (n 19).
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which surfaces the potential risks created by an app and makes them accountable to
developers (Figure 4).
Our interest in risk goes beyond the requirements of GDPR to also include
technological and social risk (eg the risks occasioned by actuating physical infrastruc-
ture such as windows and doors or of building apps that exploit sensing to monitor
environmental conditions but unintentionally reveal insights into users’ everyday
lives). Each ‘node’ in the SDK (Figure 4) allows developers to rapidly construct apps
by connecting data, processors and outputs together, has a predefined spectrum of
risk attached to it from 0 to 5. The final risk rating assigned to an app sits within this
spectrum and is determined by how the nodes are configured (eg the hardware they
work with, the data they process, what they do with the data, etc). The final risk rat-
ing is encoded in the app and made available to users on the app store and in the
app manifest as outlined above but the value here lies in sensitizing developers to
risk ‘in the course of’ app construction, thereby reducing the overhead of building
apps that will be severely rated (and potentially unpopular) and promoting the de-
velopment of low-risk apps that are socially, technologically and legally acceptable.
The spectrum of control rights is further enabled by IoT Databox Dashboard’s notifi-
cation function, which allows the results of processing to be ‘previewed’ prior to dis-
tribution (should an app take data off the box), and the Dashboard also allows users
to exercise the ultimate sanction and immediately revoke access by terminating data
processing entirely.
Requirement 4: guaranteeing greater transparency rights
GDPR establishes a mandate for opening up the opaque IoT and providing more
transparent information to data subjects. Transparency is key to enabling control
Figure 4: The SDK: risk-rating apps during their development.
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rights insofar as data subjects cannot action them without knowing who controllers
are, and what they are doing to their data. The IoT Databox takes significant steps to
increase transparency in surfacing M2M interactions and the social actors on whose
behalf they operate. The manifest clearly plays an important role in this respect, with
the multi-layered notice approach scaffolding information depending on intended
audience, providing legal and technical information as well as ‘user-friendly’ accounts
of apps and their data processing operations. The app store also enhances transpar-
ency in providing social feedback through a commonly understood ‘rating’
mechanism.
Further to this, the IoT Databox Dashboard provides the data subject with a
range of functions that are designed to make data processing transparent. In addition
to enabling users to download and rate apps, the Dashboard (Figure 5a) allows users
to manage data sources and device drivers to enable data sources to write to data
stores; to manage data stores, including sharing, clearing or deleting stores; to man-
age notifications, including previewing the results of data processing prior to distribu-
tion; and to audit data processing operations, including viewing all accesses to data
stores and all data transactions, and enabling data processing to quickly put on hold
or terminated. The Dashboard also allows users to inspect ‘how’ data flows through
an app and how some action or decision is ‘arrived at’ which speaks to the transpar-
ency and accountability in algorithms requirement as detailed in Article 22 GDPR.
For example, Figure 5b shows how a health insurance quote is arrived at by process-
ing environmental sensors in the home and fitness tracker data to classify level of ac-
tivity and processing shopping data to identify calorie band. These results are further
processed to predict life expectancy and risk of critical illness. The final results are
then used to output a quote. Each of the input and processor nodes is inspectable to
reveal the data and processing results. Importantly, the ‘revelation’ is entirely local as
processing happens on-the-box, thus ensuring the data subject’s privacy.
Figure 5: (a) The IoT Databox dashboard (b) inspectable data processing.
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Requirement 5: ensuring lawfulness of processing
It is a condition of GDPR that the lawful grounds upon which processing stand be
made accountable to data subjects. While a number of legitimate grounds are pos-
sible in law, the IoT Databox provides for consent, and consent alone, as the legal
basis for data processing and for apps to operate on the platform. The manifest
‘coupled with the underlying architecture’ plays a key role in turning the various per-
missions implicated in consenting to data processing, particularly the data sources
used and the frequency of sampling and reporting, into locally ‘enforceable’ data
processing policies. This is done by the IoT Databox’s arbiter component, which
issues data store access tokens to apps and checks their data processing permissions.
As noted above, the data subject may withdraw consent at any time and terminate
processing. Obviously IoT devices which first export data to the cloud and subse-
quently make it available to data subjects via APIs render data subjects reliant on
third-party terms and conditions, including other grounds for processing.
Requirement 6: protecting data storage and security
Given the poor standard of security that currently affects the IoT, there is a lot of
work to be done in safeguarding data and satisfying quick data breach notifications.
GDPR clearly pushes towards technical approaches to doing this.60 A combination
of IoT Databox approaches assist with this requirement. First, the IoT Databox dis-
tributes data across data stores or ‘containers’ in more technical language. Containers
are manifold, with each unique data source having not only a container of its own
but a potential array of containers associated with it, which are produced as the result
of data processing (eg an app may process data from temperature, humidity and air
quality sensors and create a new data store that holds data on environmental condi-
tions in the home). This containerized approach exploits a ‘honeycomb’ rather than
‘honey pot’ approach (unlike centralized cloud servers) forcing an attacker to ‘hack’
each container to access data, which is itself encrypted at rest. This approach does
not prevent attacks on online data sources (ie IoT devices which first export data to
the cloud), but it does make attacking data on-the-box extremely challenging.
Furthermore, the arbiter component (in line with consent permissions) regulates
and manages which apps get to run on-the-box, what data are accessed and what
processing operations are allowed to run on the data. The IoT Databox also logs all
data processing operations, including data export, for audit. These logs may be ana-
lysed to identify potential data breaches, though challenges exist in working out how
to best achieve this (eg it may possible to detect some breaches automatically, where-
as others may require manual identification by an expert).
Requirement 7: articulating and responding to processing responsibilities
GDPR encourages the adoption of mechanisms for data controllers to articulate their
responsibilities, which is key to increasing public trust in the IoT. The IoT Databox
SDK provides one such mechanism, enabling a relatively lightweight technological
approach towards articulating compliance challenges ‘to developers’ working on a
controller or associated data processor’s behalf. This recognizes that IoT developers,
60 art 32 GDPR.
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especially those in SMEs and start-ups, often lack the organizational resources
needed to understand and respond to these challenges,61 a situation more broadly
confounded by the knowledge and skills deficit confronting organizational actors (eg
lawyers lacking technical knowledge and technologists lacking legal knowledge). As
one developer puts it, by way of example,
Unfortunately the European Union’s new GDPR, introduced on 25th May
2018, creates uncertainty and risk that I can’t justify taking. GDPR threatens
[developers] with fines of 4% of turnover or e20 million (whichever is higher)
if they do not jump through a number of ambiguously-defined hoops. The law,
combined with parasitic no-win-no-fee legal firms, puts [developers] at risk of
vindictive reporting. Young websites and non-profits cannot afford legal teams.
Therefore the risk posed by GDPR is unacceptably high. Perversely, this new
EU law hurts small and ethical startups, but helps reinforce the dominance of
Facebook, Google and Twitter, who are able to prepare and defend themselves
using established legal teams and cash reserves, and who now face less compe-
tition from startups. The EU Cookie Law, EU VAT regulation and now the
EU GDPR are all examples of poorly-implemented laws that add complexity
and unintended side-effects for businesses within the EU.62
The SDK plays a key role in helping developers understand key accountability
requirements of GDPR and enables them to respond effectively in articulating a
range of potential risks, social and technological as well as legal in the course of data
processing app development. The app store in turn conveys the risks occasioned by
an app to the public along with an app’s verified status and accredits apps that do
not take data off-the-box, thus certifying that the ‘highest’ degree of responsibility is
exercised in data processing by app developers and the parties on whose behalf those
apps operate.
DEMONSTRABLY DOING ACCOUNTABILITY
As noted in introducing this article, the need to build accountability into the IoT is
motivated by the opaque nature of distributed data flows, inadequate consent mecha-
nisms and lack of interfaces enabling end-user control over the behaviours of
Internet-enabled devices. This lack of accountability precludes meaningful engage-
ment by end users with their personal data and undermines both trust and the on-
going development of the digital economy. GDPR seeks to remedy the problem by
mandating that a rapidly developing technological ecosystem be made accountable.
In doing so, it foregrounds new responsibilities for data controllers and anticipates
that these will implicate the technological ecosystem itself. Just how these responsi-
bilities, which emphasize putting in place compliance measures and demonstrating
accountability, might be exercised in the technological ecosystem is problematic,
61 Lachlan Urquhart (in print), ‘White Noise from the White Goods? Conceptual and Empirical
Perspectives on Ambient Domestic Computing’ in Lilian Edwards, Burkhard Schafer and Edina Harbinja
(eds), Future Law: Emerging Technology, Ethics and Regulation (Edinburgh University Press forthcoming)
<https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.07185.pdf> accessed 21 June 2018.
62 Streetlend is no more <https://www.streetlend.com> accessed 21 June 2018.
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Table 2: How the IoT Databox Meets Accountability Requirements
Accountability Requirement IoT Databox Compliance Measure
1. Limiting initial data
collection
• The IoT Databox architecture situates data processing
at the edge of the network in the data subject’s envir-
onment, enables the data subject to control external
access to data via app manifests that provide granular
choice encoded as enforceable data processing policies
on-the-box, and constrains data distribution to the
results of processing.
2. Limitations on inter-
national data transfer
• Insofar as data is not taken off-the-box by an app, the
requirement is negated.
• Insofar as data is taken off-the-box by the user backing
up data in the cloud, the user retains control over
where the data is placed for storage.
• Insofar as data is taken off-the-box by app, the manifest
provides the data subject with the information required
by Article 13 GDPR in the condensed layer of the
manifest’s multilayered notice.
• The app manifest also ﬂags data transfer as a risk in
the short layer, which increases in direct relation to ac-
cess, further recipients and their location, adequacy
decisions and safeguards.
3. Responding to the spec-
trum of control rights
• Insofar as data is not taken off-the-box by an app, the
requirement is negated.
• Insofar as data is taken off-the-box by an app, the spec-
trum of rights is outside the control of the IoT
Databox, though the raw data is retained on-the-box
and the speciﬁc processing operations performed on
the raw data are logged for audit.
• Insofar as data is taken off-the-box by an app and on-
line access is provided, any data made available to the
data subject (either via APIs or in common machine-
readable formats) may be imported into the IoT
Databox for other processing as per the right to data
portability.
• As the right to data portability does not include statis-
tical inferences derived from data processing, the IoT
Databox seeks to incentivize the construction of apps
that do not take data off-the-box through risk-rating
mechanisms in the SDK, the app store and the app
manifest, and through accreditation.
• The IoT Databox allows data subjects to preview the
results of data processing prior to distribution, to
(Continued)
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Table 2: (continued)
Accountability Requirement IoT Databox Compliance Measure
terminate data processing at any time and to revoke
access.
4. Guaranteeing greater
transparency rights
• The app manifest surfaces M2M interactions and the
social actors on whose behalf they operate and proc-
essing takes place.
• Manifests exploit a multilayered approach to make
data processing accountable in legal, technical and
‘user-friendly’ terms.
• The dashboard enables the data subject to view data
processing in real time, including notiﬁcations of proc-
essing operations, previews of the results of processing
and inspection of how results were arrived at as per
Article 22.
• The app store exploits a commonly understood social
‘rating’ mechanism to enhance transparency.
5. Ensuring lawfulness of
processing
• Data processing on the IoT Databox operates on the
grounds of consent only.
• Consent is provided for by the app manifest, with spe-
ciﬁc permissions to access data sources and granular
choices over data sampling and reporting frequencies
being encoded as enforceable processing policies by
the IoT Databox arbiter.
• Consent may be withdrawn and processing terminated
by the data subject at any time.
6. Protecting data storage
and security
• The IoT Databox stores data in a distributed array of
containers, which encrypt data at rest.
• The arbiter component regulates and manages app ac-
cess to data stores and data processing operations,
based on permissions set by the data subject.
• All data processing operations, including data export,
are logged for audit.
7. Articulating and respond-
ing to processing
responsibilities
• The SDK articulates compliance challenges to IoT
developers in the course of app and manifest
construction.
• The app store articulates risks associated with an app
to the public, including legal, technical and social risks,
and an app’s veriﬁed status.
• The app store also accredits apps that do not take data
off-the-box, certifying the highest level of responsibility
in data processing.
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however. This is not only because GDPR is ‘technologically neutral’ but because it
does not explicitly define what compliance with the accountability principal should
amount to or what and an account should look like. In reviewing GDPR, we have
therefore sought identify key components of an account and to subsequently articu-
late how these might be built into the technological ecosystem with specific respect
to the IoT. We have thus explored how the IoT Databox might enable the imple-
mentation of compliance measures and demonstration of accountability.
Accountability requirements are laid out in Table 1. The specific ways in which the
IoT Databox implements measures to comply with them are laid out in Table 2.
The IoT Databox provides a prima facie example of what a demonstrably compli-
ant account might ‘look like’ from a technological perspective. It also makes it per-
spicuous to whom accountability is demonstrated: primarily to data subjects and IoT
developers/data controllers, but the demonstration also extends to a range of other
parties from technical experts to regulators and supervisory authorities, whose inqui-
ries might be facilitated by the transparent and auditable characteristics of the IoT
Databox. The account is articulated through a distinctive software architecture and
development environment that implements compliance measures (data limitation,
enhancing transparency, articulating responsibilities, etc) and interactional arrange-
ments (app stores, apps, manifests, dashboard, etc) that are designed to demon-
strably respond to the accountability requirements of GDPR. It is in ‘doing being
accountable’ as a demonstrable feature of constructing, publishing and using IoT
Databox apps that compliance is therefore achieved. The demonstration reflexively
tackles the various regulatory problems of the IoT, which occasion the need for ac-
countability in the first instance. Thus, the IoT Databox makes an opaque techno-
logical infrastructure visible, provides clear consent mechanisms rendering data
processing legible and enables data subjects to control the flow of data. It also pro-
vides oversight on M2M communications along with what the data is being used for,
where and by whom. In making data processing in the IoT accountable, the IoT
Databox seeks to go beyond remedying existing problems with the IoT, however.
Ultimately it seeks to foster a culture of accountability that results in widespread data
minimization, and local processing wherever possible to engender widespread trust
in the IoT.
Data protection must move from ‘theory to practice’ . . . accountability based
mechanisms have been suggested as a way [to] . . . implement practical tools
for effective data protection.63
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